Iran’s Islamic Republic, born of revolution against the Shah’s secular tyranny, fused clerical and revolutionary power. The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council retain veto authority, prioritising ideology-to retain brutal power over popular will. Recurrent protests, including major mobilisations in recent years amid economic strain and external conflicts, expose disillusionment. The system has evolved into its own theocratic authoritarianism, not the balanced justice of classical models, writes Delhi-based Historian Dr. Smita Pandey.
Play For everything that is really great and inspiring is created by the individual who can labour in freedom – Einstein resonates but arrogant governance still refuses to comprehend. Even the basics of freedom are denied to the hapless populace and the erudite. Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on demands for Islamic law in Muslim societies needs a reality check amid persistent authoritarianism and violent turmoil afflicting the region currently.
Francis Fukuyama, reflecting on the 2009 Green Movement in Iran, offered a nuanced explanation for why many in Muslim-majority countries yearn for Shariah. Drawing on legal scholar Noah Feldman, he suggested that this demand often reflects not a craving for theocratic excess but a search for constraints on arbitrary rule. In pre-modern Islamic polities, independent ulema upheld Shariah as a check on sultans, creating a form of limited governance rooted in divine law rather than raw coercion. Modern secular autocrats, by contrast, wield unchecked power, unbound by institutions or accountability. Calls for Shariah, in this view, represent a revolt against predation and a bid for justice and predictability.
Fifteen years after the Arab Spring and well into 2026, this perspective invites scrutiny. Across much of the Muslim world, the rule of law remains elusive, nominal democracies are hollowed out by military or elite capture, and Islamist experiments have largely failed to deliver the promised restraints. While grievances against tyranny are real, Shariah advocacy has frequently substituted one form of unaccountable power for another, underscoring deeper institutional deficits.
Classical Islamic governance did feature mechanisms where rulers, though absolute in many ways, operated within Shariah bounds interpreted by scholars. This offered predictability absent in many post-colonial states. Colonialism, secular nation-building—from Atatürk’s Turkey to Nasser’s Egypt—and centralised authoritarian models eroded these traditions, concentrating power in executives backed by armies and patronage networks.
The resulting vacuum propelled Islamist resurgence. Polls have long shown majority support in places like Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan for Shariah as the basis of law, driven by the disgust at corruption and brutality under secular strongmen. Yet, as events since 2011 reveal, translating this into effective checks on power has proven elusive.
The 2011 uprisings tested Fukuyama’s thesis dramatically. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, revolts against personalist dictators initially empowered Islamists promising justice through Islamic governance. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood secured elections, but Mohamed Morsi’s majoritarian style and institutional overreach alienated broad sections. The 2013 military intervention restored—and deepened—authoritarianism under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. As of 2026, Egypt remains a template of military-dominated governance, where the armed forces control significant economic and political levers, sidelining civilian rule and independent judiciary.
Tunisia’s trajectory, once hailed as Arab Spring’s success, has regressed with President Kais Saied’s power consolidation. Pakistan illustrates hybrid authoritarianism with stark clarity for Indian observers. Elected governments function meekly under the military’s shadow, which has repeatedly intervened. Recent constitutional amendments have further entrenched military supremacy, granting figures like Field Marshal Asim Munir sweeping authority, lifelong immunity, and dominance over civilian institutions. Judicial independence is compromised, and military courts bypass due process. Shariah elements in personal and blasphemy laws often serve selective repression rather than broad accountability.
Iran’s Islamic Republic, born of revolution against the Shah’s secular tyranny, fused clerical and revolutionary power. The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council retain veto authority, prioritising ideology-to retain brutal power over popular will. Recurrent protests, including major mobilisations in recent years amid economic strain and external conflicts, expose disillusionment. The system has evolved into its own theocratic authoritarianism, not the balanced justice of classical models.
In Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, economic modernisation is executed under monarchical control and selective Shariah. Afghanistan’s Taliban regime embodies the extreme: totalising Shariah has brought neither prosperity nor legitimacy. Indonesia and Malaysia offer relative hybrid stability—democratic facades with Islamic influences—but grapple with pressures on minorities and occasional elite interference.
Syria’s post-2024 landscape, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, sees Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in power. The group projects moderation for international acceptance while retaining jihadist roots, highlighting the radicals’ dilemma: ideological purity versus pragmatic governance.
Several factors limit Shariah’s efficacy as a modern check. Classical restraints relied on independent ulema; today’s Islamists often centralise authority in parties or councils, merging religion and state in ways that empower new elites. Divine sovereignty complicates popular law-making, hindering liberal constitutionalism. Applications remain selective—hudud punishments capture attention, but governance blends modern statutes, resource rents, and security needs that evade traditional limits. Blasphemy laws, popular in some circles, frequently stifle dissent rather than curb rulers.
Military and security elites transcend the purported ideology. Post-colonial armies positioned as stability guardians embedded privileges in constitutions. Popular fatigue after chaos—Arab Spring fallout, civil wars—often legitimises their role. Global indices from Freedom House and others consistently rank most Muslim-majority states low on rule of law, civil liberties, and executive constraints. Corruption and patronage endure across secular and Islamist frames. Islamist experiments, from Sudan to Hamas-controlled areas, have prioritised survival and purity over pluralism.
Broader patterns suggest institutions, history, and culture outweigh religion alone. Non-Arab cases like Indonesia demonstrate pluralism’s potential when paired with economic growth. Yet Islam’s intimate tie to law and politics creates unique tensions with secular liberal models.
For India, neighbour Pakistan’s deepening military entrenchment and hybrid governance carry direct security and stability implications. Regional volatility arising from weak rule of law fuels extremism, cross-border tensions, and migration pressures.
Fukuyama captured a genuine longing for limits on tyranny. But nostalgia proves insufficient. Sustainable governance demands hybrid frameworks respecting cultural and religious contexts while institutionalising separation of powers, judicial independence, property rights, and minority protections. Education fostering critical thinking, economic diversification beyond rents, and civil society bridging sectarian divides are essential.
Reformers, both within and outside these societies, must move beyond binary secular-Islamist choices. External engagement should emphasise capacity-building for rule of law over ideological exports. Ultimately, the Muslim world’s governance crises arise less from Shariah’s absence than from frail institutions and misaligned incentives. Demands for Islamic rule voice legitimate protests against brutality, yet without mechanisms for adaptability, inclusion, and accountability, they risk perpetuating cycles of arbitrary power.
True freedom lies in evolving traditions to address contemporary complexities—building impersonal institutions that transcend weaponising any single ideology or strongman. In 2026, the evidence suggests this evolution remains painfully incomplete.
(Dr. Smita Pandey is Delhi-based Historian)
